Category: Reverse-Engineering

Ever wanted to find a nice tool to easily represent cartography results and other graphs? The Sourcetrail tool could be a nice solution! In this blog post, we will introduce two of our tools: Numbat, a new Python API for Sourcetrail, and Pyrrha, a mapper collection for firmware cartography.

In this blog post we discuss how to debug Windows' Isolated User Mode (IUM) processes, also known as Trustlets, using the virtual TPM of Microsoft Hyper-V as our target.

This blog post presents an overview of Starlink's User Terminal runtime internals, focusing on the communications that happen within the device and with user applications and some tools that can help further research on the same topic.

In this blogpost we present our brand new version of binbloom, a tool to find the base address of any 32 and 64-bit architecture firmware, and dig into the new method we designed to recover this grail on both of these architectures.

A step by step approach to reverse engineer Hyper-V and have a low level insight into Virtual Trust Levels.

This article describes how Windows Defender implements its network inspection feature inside the kernel through the use of WFP (Windows Filtering Platform), how the device object’s security descriptor protects it from being exposed to potential vulnerabilities and details some bugs I found. As a complement to this post, a small utility is released to test the different bugs.

Microsoft is currently working on Xtended Flow Guard (XFG), an evolved version of Control Flow Guard (CFG), their own control flow integrity implementation. XFG works by restricting indirect control flow transfers based on type-based hashes of function prototypes. This blog post is a deep dive into how the MSVC compiler generates those XFG function prototype hashes.

This third article from the Samsung's TrustZone series details some vulnerabilities that were found and how they were exploited to obtain code execution in EL3.

In March 2020, Google patched a critical vulnerability affecting many MediaTek based devices. This vulnerability had been known by MediaTek since April 2019, and later exploited in the wild! In this post, we give some details about this vulnerability and see how we can use it to achieve kernel memory reads and writes.

In this second blog post of our series on Samsung's TrustZone, we present the various tools that we have developed during our research to help us reverse engineer and exploit Trusted Applications as well as Secure Drivers.